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BY THE NUMBERS: MAKASSAR’S TRADE, 
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Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
ABSTRACT
The valuable trade statistics provided by the Netherlands Indies government are a boon 
to researchers, but should not be accepted at face value. The extent to which shippers 
avoided registration is indicated by a comparison of Makassar’s trade figures before 
and after it was made a free-port in 1847, while early twentieth-century data from 
Makassar itself show a significantly higher level of maritime traffic than Batavia’s 
do. This suggests that central statistical series can seriously misrepresent local trade.
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“As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we 
do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we 
don't know...it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Department of Defence briefing, 12 February2002
INTRODUCTION
Innumerate historians such as myself are deeply grateful to scholars like Anne 
Booth who combine a mastery of economic theory and quantitative sources 
with a clear understanding of the weight of the past. Statistical series enable 
historians to trace underlying processes over time. But, alas, few such sources 
exist, and all – but particularly the older ones - are marked by the limited 
reach, specific aims and variable categorizations of their compilers. While 
new publications, such as the Changing Economy of Indonesia volumes, have 
1 I am grateful to Alex Claver for his comments and assistance, and to Thomas Lindblad for 
his careful editing.
00-MI-39,-No 2-2013.indd   289 02/06/2014   15:42:17
290 | Masyarakat Indonesia, Volume 39, No. 2, Desember 2013
helped make this tangled treasure trove of colonial statistics more accessible, 
regions with little documentation run the risk of being marginalized. It was 
only the publication of Edward Poelinggomang’s work, with its trade and 
shipping figures, which allowed Anne Booth to include Makassar in her 
account of nineteenth-century economic growth outside Java (Booth 1998: 
25-9; Poelinggomang 1993).
My purpose in this contribution is to explore some of the problems that arise 
when we begin to extract numbers from self-referring diachronic sources, and 
instead try to use them to describe actual local economies. My examples are 
drawn from the trade of Makassar, a vital East Indies port, from the 1700s 
to 1918. Although Makassar included a Dutch East India Company (VOC, 
1602-1796) garrison settlement from 1669, the Southwest Sulawesi peninsula 
itself was only fully colonized after 1906. Documents and data produced by 
officials in this (proto-) colonial outpost of Dutch bureaucracy depicted not the 
world within which they operated, but those aspects of it that were within their 
political and managerial reach. Although the gap between paper and human 
realities might have been particularly wide in Makassar’s case, I believe that 
they are illustrative of a much more general divergence that should be born in 
mind by anyone working on Western sources, particularly statistics. So in this 
piece I am more concerned with the information that is NOT there, than with 
the data provided.
STATISTICS IN THE DUTCH INDIES
Both the VOC and its successor, the Netherlands Indies government, tried to 
control and exploit trade, directing it towards their Batavia headquarters. But a 
strong trading tradition linked harbours with each other across the South China 
and Java seas and the more eastern Sulu, Sulawesi and Banda waters. The 
extensive archipelago was also open to penetration by outsiders, particularly 
the British. Batavia was unable to control evasion of customs regimes so the 
data it received ware partial at best.
As a transnational trading venture the VOC paid careful attention to its 
accounts, managed by the Bookkeeper-General,2  and compiled endless lists 
on matters such as shipping. For the Company, information, like its maps, 
2 These accounts, covering 18,000 voyages and 250,000 commodity descriptions were 
digitalized. 
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was a commercial asset to be kept secret. The VOC archives are now an 
unrivalled source on early modern Indonesia. Gerrit Knaap and myself used 
the harbourmaster’s registers of Makassar’s eighteenth-century shipping 
and cargoes to examine sea-borne commerce, experiencing for ourselves the 
potential and problems of such material (Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 272). 
The registers enabled us to see patterns which would have been invisible to 
contemporaries, even to the officials who compiled them. Existing assumptions 
about the decline of trade under the VOC were modified, while the impact of 
Chinese commerce in Eastern Indonesia became clearer. Yet we were always 
aware of the limitations of the data, distortions created by fluctuating policies 
and levels of political control, shifts in supply and demand, as well as more 
local issues of competence and corruption.
It was only at the end of the 1700s that a more scientific appreciation of the 
public use of statistics began to emerge. This was exemplified for Java by early 
nineteenth-century administrators, particularly the Napoleonic Daendels (1807-
1810) and British Raffles (1811-1816). The reforming Governor-General Van 
der Capellen (1818-1826) was very aware of the need for reliable data. Annual 
residency reports, now in the Jakarta archives, date from his period, as do the 
first published trade lists, on Java and Madura. A separate series for the Outer 
Islands followed (Verslag van den handel 1825-1871; Overzigt 1846-1869). 
Further statistical exercises in Java were intended to facilitate the land tax 
(landrente), but also exposed the inadequacy of existing data and collection 
methods. In the case of the trade statistics, the primary purpose was to 
document customs revenue, as the government was concerned that Singapore, 
founded by the British in 1819, was becoming too central to Indies shipping 
(Van de Graaff 1955: 97-8; Singgih 2003). After the Dutch constitutional 
reforms of 1848 parliament received an annual report on the colonies, which 
became a subject of political debate. The Koloniaal Verslag (Colonial Report), 
and its successor Indisch Verslag (The Indies Report), published detailed 
statistics from 1849 to the Second World War (Verslag van het beheer 1849-
1866; KoloniaalVerslag 1867-1923; Statistisch jaaroverzicht 1923-1930; 
Indisch Verslag 1931-1940). Data on the colonies were also incorporated into 
the Netherlands’ economic annual reports.3
3 See http://archive.org/stream/staatkundigenst03unkngoog/staatkundigenst03unkngoog_
djvu. txt
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Reliance on early figures can lead to gross misinterpretations, particularly 
because numerical data seem so concrete and convincing that they give 
researchers a false sense of security. It was not until the late nineteenth 
century, as political control advanced, that numbers for the main colonial 
centres became less unreliable. As the central bureaucracy developed, different 
departments issued own data of their own, using varying categorizations and 
creating confusion (Statistiek van den handel 1870-1906; Statistiek van den 
handel, de scheepvaart (1871-1875). From 1874 the distinction between Java 
and the Outer Islands was dropped, and with it the detailed information on 
each administrative region’s inter-insular traffic in various commodities. 
Only the trade between the Netherlands Indies and overseas was included. 
However, in 1879 imports and exports by private enterprise were again listed 
by province (Van den Berg 1907: 348-9). In 1892 a Central Office for Statistics 
was established in another attempt to impose order on the muddle. In 1907 
Java and Madura were again separated from the Outer Islands, and in 1910 
shipping became a separate series.
The need for international standardization was increasingly clear, but the Indies 
data were inadequately organized, as different levels or regions of shipping 
activity were included or excluded, and commodity categorizations varied. 
After 1912 an important change in trade data presentation exposed commercial 
sectors that had previously been unrecorded. Prior to this only traffic between 
different provinces and the first and last ports-of-call for steamships had been 
noted, but after 1912 intra-provincial shipping and packet-ships intermediate 
visits were also listed (Touwen 2002). The results were particularly revealing 
for transit ports like Makassar, a staple place for products brought in by coastal 
vessels (including a strong fleet of trading perahu) to await the KPM packets 
or foreign ships. In 1918 a new Instruction for the Compilation of Statistics 
for Trade and Customs was issued, but the resulting commodity name list was 
still unsatisfactory and was revised in 1925.Goods exceeding 1,000 guilders 
in value were divided into 16 aggregate categories. This standard was applied 
to Java from 1926 and the Outer Islands from 1928 (Clemens, Lindblad and 
Touwen 1992), and remained in force until the beginning of 1948.
Two simple points emerge from this brief review of statistical history: firstly, 
there is an impressive amount of material, and secondly, the process of 
compilation has always been problematic, even for those working at the higher 
levels of abstraction. This was even more apparent at the other end of the data 
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gathering process. The situation of local Dutch officials was complicated in 
very different ways. They struggled to reconcile Batavia’s demands for clarity 
with their often precarious political role and consequent limited access to 
reliable information. In outposts like Makassar this was very clear. The desire 
in particular to enforce a general Dutch customs zone, eliminating competition 
by independent regional ports, led to colonial rule after 1906.
MAKASSAR’S TRADE
During Makassar’s long history commodity flows adjusted to take advantage 
of changing demand and supply conditions, access to capital, and technology. 
In the seventeenth century rice and slave exports predominated, while Indian 
textile imports were central. The court and its foreign merchant allies exploited 
the most profitable routes. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, Makassar 
had become a hub in the South China Sea trade. It was the essential entrepot, 
clearing house and processor for maritime commodities (particularly tripang) 
shipped from the south-eastern Indonesian islands to China. From 1746 until 
the 1820s exchange was dominated by the Amoy junk, with lesser connections 
to Canton and Macau. Chinese traders flourished and the VOC, quite outside 
the system, benefited from taxes. In theory, all voyages to the west of Batavia 
were prohibited. Yet a significant traffic continued to link Makassar with the 
Malacca Straits in defiance of Company rules; this trade is almost invisible in 
Dutch sources. The entrepreneurial Wajorese, alongside Mandarese and other 
Buginese played a key role, shipping textiles (Sutherland and Bree 1987), 
and products such as gambir, an ingredient in the widely-chewed betel-nut 
preparation sirih.
Makassar’s Asian-led commercial boom continued through the 1780s. Tripang 
and rattan passed through en route to Amoy, slaves were sent to Batavia, 
money and Chinese commodities to Nusa Tenggara Barat and Timur. Java 
supplied arak, tobacco, and Indian textiles, while Sumbawa provided rice and 
raw cotton. The latter was also, along with Bonerate and Buton, a general 
rendezvous for the trepan fleets working the waters from the Flores Sea to 
the Sulawesi coast, and along the shores of Australia and Papua. Chinese and 
Malay merchants flourished, but the predominantly mestizo Europeans had 
to rely on supplying slaves to Batavia. Sulawesians were prominent in the 
southern seas. After making some rather heroic assumptions, Gerrit Knaap 
and myself concluded that trade over the entire period trade grew by 2.1 per 
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cent, with a compound growth rate of ca.4 per cent after 1770 (Knaap and 
Sutherland 2004). This vigorous Asian economy contrasted with the political 
and economic decline of the Company in South Sulawesi, as Bone asserted its 
control over much of the peninsula, choking Dutch Makassar’s access to slaves 
and rice (Jacobs 2006).
The increasingly peripheral role of the Dutch in Makassar was confirmed by 
the shift of East Indonesian trade to Singapore. Sea and forest products, and 
later agricultural commodities destined for China and Europe, were shipped 
there in exchange for textiles, opium and weapons. From the late 1830s coffee, 
promoted by local rulers and Dutch officials, proved a valuable and ultimately 
dominant commodity. Much was exported by the semi-official Netherlands 
Trading Association (NHM, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij), but about 
one-third of the coffee harvest left directly from ‘native’ ports, by-passing 
Makassar.4 In an effort to break these Singapore-centered networks, Makassar 
was made a (partially) free port in 1847 (Poelinggomang 2002). Dutch 
commercial institutions, private German and Dutch merchants opened offices 
in Makassar, focused on trade with Europe. The main exports were still coffee 
and tripang and forest products, while the chief imports were textiles, opium 
and yarns.
The Netherlands sought ‘to impose a narrow bilateralism’ on the Indies (Dick 
1990: 296), with trade and shipping concentrated in Dutch hands and on Dutch 
ports, particularly Batavia. These efforts were strengthened by steam shipping, 
particularly the formation of the KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, 
Royal Packet Company) line (1888-1966) and, around the turn of the century, 
by direct shipping to the West. There was then a growing European interest in 
sea and forest products such as latex, rattan, pearls, mother-of-pearl, ebony and 
bird skins. At the end of the 1800s coffee was the dominant export, although 
copra was emerging. Textiles and opium were the chief imports. Within twenty 
years, however, copra had become the backbone of Makassar’s exports, and 
non-textile manufactures made up a significant proportion of imports. By then 
Makassar’s long-distance trade was integrated into the commercial networks 
of the mature colonial economy, while maintaining less visible, but crucial ties 
with Singapore, Hong Kong and Southern China.
4  ANRI, Jakarta:  Makassar. Vol. 7/7, 9/4. See Appendix, Trade. 
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CONTEXTUALIZING MAKASSAR’S TRADE STATISTICS
The archives in Jakarta, Makassar and The Hague contain many statistical 
fragments. But the data on Makassar are so scattered and variable, and give 
such a partial view of the processes described, that it is useless for large- 
scale analysis. Yet it is very valuable, if it can be critically contextualised, 
which is not always easy. To illustrate this I will give several examples of how 
the statistics recording Makassar’s trade were shaped by political realities, 
government policy and/or changes in collecting procedures. Often varying 
sets of data were kept by separate officials for different purposes, and a large 
proportion of Makassar’s traffic was either completely unrecorded or noted by 
local power-holders who kept no archives.
The VOC only had the legal right to control the trade of its own subjects5, and 
could not interfere with people under other jurisdictions, such as those of local 
rulers. Moreover, since the Dutch harbourmaster did not tax vessels under c.2 
tons, and since local coastal traffic (including hubs like Bira and Bonerate) was 
generally exempt, his brief only covered interregional trade by Dutch subjects. 
It is estimated that even in this sector c. 20 per cent trade was unreported 
(Knaap and Sutherland 2004: 8).
The king of powerful Bone was a crucial ally of the Dutch. He spent a couple 
of months a year at his court at Bontoala, just east of the city, and controlled 
much of the densely settled Makassar area. The Bugis kampung north of 
the fort included the quarter of the famously entrepreneurial Wajorese and 
the vigorous Bugis market. The Dutch had to accept their exclusion from 
these settlements for political reasons. Trading centres further north, like 
Mandar and Kaili, were also free of VOC control. Since the VOC anchorage 
enforced higher charges, the Bugis market was preferred by many traders, 
and consequently the most valuable imports, Indian textiles, were cheaper in 
Makassar than Batavia, which severely limited VOC imports into Makassar.
In 1767 the Company’s harbourmaster at Makassar carried out an official 
enquiry into the ‘present condition of trade, not only insofar as it concerns 
the small number of our inhabitants, but all the principle places of commerce 
in this Government’. He sought the true cause of the collapse of our sales, 
5 These included immigrant communities like Chinese and Malays, and kampung inhabitants 
not under independent lords.
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and why it is that the native can obtain English goods6  in better quality and 
for a lower price than the Company is able to deliver, as well as to why 
native woven goods are preferred to those which the Company brings’. His 
report describes perahu from Wajo and Mandar (both regions with a strong 
weaving tradition) carrying local textiles to Riau, at the strategic southern 
end of the Malacca Straits, where they were sold for Spanish dollars. These 
they took north, to the Malay sultanates of Kedah and Selangor, where the 
coins were more valuable. They then purchased ‘English’ cloth for sale in 
Sulawesi and further east. Wajorese and Mandarese were also doing brisk 
business with the Anglo-American country traders from India who sought sea 
and forest products to exchange for tea in China. They frequented the coasts 
of Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sulu (Warren 1981).7 It is highly probable that 
some inhabitants of Makassar participated in this trade. Just up the coast from 
Makassar, for example, the settlement of Soreang was linked by pack-horse 
trails to the inland lakes, and from there, by the Cenrana river, to the East Coast 
harbours (Poelinggomang 2002: 136-8; Knaap and Sutherland 2004:20).
In reality the VOC only controlled traffic between their main settlements, 
particularly those in Java and in Maluku.
During the second half of the eighteenth century the VOC harbourmaster was 
not the only person monitoring Makassar’s trade. The revenue-farmer, who 
paid an annual sum to the Company for the right to collect customs duties, was 
also losing income because of the Bugis trade. He reached an accommodation 
with the Bone ruler in 1774, paying him for the right to tax shipping in his 
areas, and accepted a Bugis ‘assistant’ for customs collection in Makassar. 
There were then three officials extracting income from the harbour, and at 
least the farmer and the harbourmaster kept books. The apparently meticulous 
Dutch records have survived in part, but only fragments from the farmer’s 
administration. The two sets of accounts ‘barely correlate’, partly because of 
different collection methods and payment calculations (Sutherland and Bree 
1987; Knaap and Sutherland  2004: 30-6).
6  This refers to products of British India, such as textiles and opium.
7 Nationaal Archief, The Hague: VOC. Vol.  3243, ff.73-81.
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MAKASSAR AS A FREE PORT: A BOOM IN TRADE AND STATISTICS
As was noted above, Makassar was made a (semi-) free port in 1847, and 
the trade statistics were duly transformed. Commodity flows which had been 
bypassing the port became more visible. Although the supply of many products 
fluctuated naturally, it is nonetheless clear that between 1846 and 1847 trade 
boomed. Traders’ calculations were determined by a number of factors, and for 
most perahu captains the balance shifted in favour of Makassar. The avoidance 
of the risks of the sea passage and easy access to cargoes were no longer 
outweighed by harbour costs. The port had always been particularly convenient 
for the perahu skippers of Eastern Indonesia, and Chinese merchants there 
were experts in assessing products like tripang. However, for commodities 
from west of the Malacca Straits, such as textiles and opium, Singapore was 
cheaper.
Between 1846 and 1847 Western textile imports rose almost tenfold, Western 
yarn imports increased sevenfold, whereas Western textile exports more than 
doubled in value (Table 1). Textile arrivals from Eastern Indonesia almost 
doubled as well with exports rising to three times the level in the preceding 
year. Opium traffic trebled, mother-of-pearl imports and exports increased 
at extreme rates; other marine commodities followed suit, though less 
dramatically. Tortoiseshell and tripang imports rose threefold and by about 
50 per cent respectively, exports fivefold and by more than 150 per cent. Rice 
imports fell by about 20 per cent, while exports climbed to six times the level 
that had prevailed in 1846. The overall change in registered commodities 
between the years 1846 and 1847 amounted to 145 per cent among imports and 
123 per cent among exports. The increase in the value of total registered trade 
between the years 1847 and 1848 was far less impressive on both accounts.
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Table 1
Makassar’s Trade in Selected Commodities, 1846-1848. 
(value in guilders)
Products
Imports
1846 1847 1848
Exports
1846 1847 1848
Coins 191 198 99 243 131 185
Coffee beans 29 71 76 12 137 68
Mother-of-pearl 5 100 88 5 96 113
Opium 55 185 188 58 155 185
Rice 100 80 55 21 134 108
Textiles (Indone-
sian)
44 86 128 36 107 178
Textiles (Indian) 6 13 172 16 16 27
Textiles (Western) 76 721 755 75 179 251
Tortoiseshell 18 53 44 23 106 115
Tripang 112 155 209 102 248 238
Yarns (Western) 17 118 123 - - -
Total (selected) 655
(60%)
1,780
(67%)
1,938
(67%)
591
(68%)
1,309
(68%)
1,289
(61%)
Total 
(registered)
1,084
(100)
2,659
(245)
2,885
(266)
868
(100)
1,933
(223)
2,104
(242)
Source: Overzigt 1846-1849: report on 1848.
Notes: Total selected commodities in value (thousand guilders) and as a percentage of all registered 
commodities. Total registered commodities in value (thousand guilders) and as a percentage of the 1846 
level (1846=100).
Source: Overzigt 1846-1849: report on 1848.
Notes: Total selected commodities in value (thousand guilders) and as a percentage of all registered 
commodities. Total registered commodities in value (thousand guilders) and as a percentage of the 1846 
level (1846=100).
The impact of the 1847 opening of Makassar created a corresponding drop in 
Singapore’s trade with Sulawesi between the 1845/46 and 1846/47 seasons, 
declining in value from 1,002,080 to 604,866 Spanish dollars, a loss of around 
40 per cent. The number of perahu sailing to the British port declined, and 
never recovered. But the increase in square-rigged shipping between the two 
ports compensated for this loss, and the sixteen years after 1847 formed the 
peak years for Singapore-Sulawesi trade, before Singapore’s economic crisis 
of the early1860s (Wong 1960: 102-5, Table IX: 22). Meanwhile, Makassar 
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became the clearing house for the perahu traffic (Wong 1960: 222).In terms 
of ships large enough to be counted, Singapore was a more important trading 
partner  for  Sulawesi,  particularly  for  the  independent  states,  than  was 
Makassar. Much of the coastal and regional traffic evaded Dutch controls 
(Poelinggomang 2002: 145-7). Indeed, it has been estimated that colonial 
officials failed to register about two-thirds of goods traded in Makassar around 
1840 (Dick et al. 2002: 94-5).
CENTRAL VERSUS LOCAL STATISTICS
The figures for Makassar’s mid-nineteenth century trade by Batavia in the 
Overzigt and the port’s own harbour administration generally agree, although 
the latter are often higher. This was the case, for example, in 1860 when local 
import and export data were respectively 11 and 22 per cent higher (Table 2). 
But problems generally arose within, rather than between, sources. However, 
as more data becomes available, inconsistencies emerge.
Table 2
Comparison of Central and Local Registration of Makassar’s Trade,
1854-1860. (value in thousand guilders, percentage = local registration as a pro-
portion of central registration)
Year
Overzigt
Imports Exports
1860 Annual report Makassar
Imports % Exports %
1856 4,473 4,066 4,517 101 4,240 104
1857 4,013 4,097 4,498 112 4,530 111
1858 4,199 4,016 4,968 118 5,241 131
1859 5,740 5,709 6,347 111 6,714 118
1860 7,870 5,067 8,736 111 6,162 122
Sources: Overzigt 1856-1860, as given in Poelinggomang 2002. Annual reports on Makassar’s trade in: 
ANRI, Jakarta: Makassar. Vol. 9/1.
If we juxtapose import and export figures from Batavia (to 1908) and Makassar 
(from 1910), there appears to be a very sudden jump in reported trade between 
the two years (Tables 3 and 4). This is somewhat unexpected, as the free-port 
status of Makassar was abolished in July 1906, and the considerable growth 
in Makassar’s trade was usually attributed to its free port status (‘Makassar’
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1879). The Overzigt figures do show an increase by 1908, but the difference 
in scale between these numbers and the local data from 1910 is considerable, 
as is the continuing gap between the harbourmaster’s statistics and those given 
by Cool (1911-1918), using Batavia’s data (Cool 1921).
Table 3
Makassar’s Trade as Reported by the Government, 1895-1908. (value in 
thousand guilders)
Year Imports Exports
1895 5,668 5,779
1900 4,292 9,282
1903 4,313 8,630
1905 4,168 9,651
1906 6,458 10,261
1907 5,515 10,533
1908 6,476 10,914
Sources: Koloniaal Verslag 1895-1908: Vol. II.Poelinggomang 2002.
Table 4
Imports and Exports of Makassar as Reported in Various Sources, 1910-
1918 (value in thousand guilders)
Year Harbour
Imports Exports
Cool
Imports Exports
Encyclopaedia
Imports Exports
1910 15,583 35,658
1911 17,060 34,618 8,229 18,341
1912 18,687 33,348 11,116 15,697
1913 24,650 34,704 18,905 15,712 14,157 18,635
1914 20,709 33,695 10,615 17,003
1915 17,239 27,161 10,355 15,415
1916 14,765 25,092 9,039 12,563
1917 17,225 20,115 16,827 13,420
1918 18,225 15,810 11,933 8,438
Sources: Jaarverslag Haven 1925; Cool 1921; Encyclopaedia 1918: ‘Makassar’.
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The authoritative Netherlands Indies Encyclopaedia, which drew its material 
from the ‘Statistisch jaaroverzicht’ in the Koloniaal Verslag over 1905, and 
agrees with Poelinggomang, gives different 1913 totals from Cool, and 
indeed could indicate an error in his figure for exports. The Makassar port 
administration’s data for 1910 are more than twice as high for imports than 
those given in the central ‘Statistisch jaaroverzicht’ for 1908; on the export side 
the difference was even larger. In 1911 the port figures are about twice those 
reported by Cool. Three years later, in 1914, the difference was still of the 
same order of magnitude in both flows of trade. By 1918 the port’s recorded 
imports were one-third higher than Cool’s data, and for exports larger still, 
virtually twice as high. These discrepancies would seem to suggest that the 
official figures may have grossly underestimated both imports and exports. 
Clearly, different shipping is being listed.
If we want to understand the actual circumstances of Makassar’s commerce 
we need to have some idea of what is, and is not, being counted. The 
change in registration practice in 1912 is an obvious possible cause of these 
discrepancies, particularly as some ports issued retrospective data, so there 
were two sets from 1903 to 1912 (Knaap 1989: 72). But the movement in the 
data sets is similar. Both show a sharp increase in imports between 1912 and
1913, with World War I soon reducing imports to pre-1912 levels. There is no 
striking change in exports.
Attempts to compare port shipping figures with central data can also be 
disconcerting, even if we limit our comparisons to steamship arrivals. Numbers 
run roughly parallel for years, before diverging and re-converging. Comparing 
the figures given in three sources, Poelinggomang, Touwen and the port 
statistics, we see that they are roughly of the same order of magnitude until
1907, when they go their separate ways. The Makassar harbour reports show 
roughly double the number of steamship arrivals as the other sources, which 
draw on the Batavia statistics (Table 5).
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Table 5
 Arrivals of Steamships in Makassar, 1907-1911. (number of vessels)
Source 1907 1908 1910 1911
Poelinggomang 314 202
Touwen 304 212 225 325
Makassar Port 342 407 497 485
Sources: Poelinggomang 2002: Appendix IV, Table 2; Touwen 2001: Tables 5k, 6k; Jaarverslag Kamer van 
Koophandel 1912.
The situation for perahu (sailing vessels) is just as complex. Three different 
authors come up with different figures reflecting their sources (Table 6).
Table 6
Perahu Shipping in Makassar in Selected Years, 1905-1933.
Source Total movement 1905
Total movements
1908 Total 1927 Total 1933
Statistiek 414 393
Makassar data 2,052 4,140 5,871 7,930
Malewa 4,944 6,986
Sources: Statistiek van den handel 1906, as given in Poelinggomang 2002: 304; Asba 2007: 86 [Makassar 
data]; Malewa 1938, as given in Singgih 2003: 172.
CONCLUSION
The Netherlands Indies trade statistics provide a seductive wealth of 
information on different ports and commodities. When analysed within their 
own frame of reference, as a series or for comparisons within the data sets, 
they are an invaluable resource. The three examples sketched above come from 
the periphery of the colonial state and a period in which most of the region 
was still controlled by virtually independent rulers. Approximate data is only 
to be expected. Nonetheless, the proportion of unreported trade is very large, 
so that the material must be critically contextualised if it is to be used for the 
specifics of local history.
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Even for regions, such as Java, where bureaucracies were stronger and sources 
both more voluminous and reliable, numbers should be treated with great 
caution. Data were filtered through several administrative levels with variable 
degrees of knowledge. Moreover, officials were not always willing to be open. 
The swings created by policy changes or shifts in compilation criteria create 
further distortions. The level of ‘unknown unknowns’ is so high that we run 
the risk of perceiving a commercial landscape that is created by the data, and 
consequently likely to be very different from the reality.
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